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Abstract  	
The major part of economic activity in Bolivia is informal, and most enterprises in Bolivia are 
micro firms. This thesis seeks to examine the characteristics of informal and formal firms in 
Bolivia. Previous studies show that the relationship between formality and revenue is 
positive. In order to test this hypothesis we use a survey with micro and small manufacturing 
firms conducted by the Bolivian National Institute of Statistics. We also examine variables 
that would affect the probability of a firm being formal. We find a significant positive 
correlation between annual revenue and formality when controlling for other relevant 
variables. We also show that firms owned by women have a negative effect on revenue. 
Furthermore, we find that education increases the probability of owning a formal firm and 
that the percentage of women in the workforce decreases the probability of a firm being 
formal.  
 
Keywords: Bolivia, informality, formal, micro enterprises, women. 	  
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1. Introduction 	
Ever since it was uncovered and defined in the early 1970’s, informal economy has been 
debated and continues to be so by policy makers and researchers. The importance of the 
global workforce outside the labour legislation or social protection makes it an important area 
in the study of economics in general and in particular development economics. 
 
A large share of global employees are not protected by labour legislation or social security. In 
spite of this, informal work has not only persisted and expanded; it has also appeared in new 
forms in unanticipated places, often limiting productivity and opportunities for growth (Chen, 
Vanek & Carr 2004). It is at the same time a facilitator of economic activity while also an 
obstacle to it. Informal activities have negative implications for employment, growth and the 
provision of public goods (Sakho & World Bank 2009). Bolivia is of key importance because 
it has the highest rate of employment in the informal economy in Latin America and the 
Caribbean (ILO 2013).  
 
A relevant characteristic of Bolivia’s high informality is the large share of informal micro 
firms, in this study defined as firms with four or less individuals. Micro firms are estimated to 
constitute 95 per cent of all enterprises in Bolivia (INE 2013). These firms are associated with 
lower profits and lower degree of formality in comparison to larger firms (World Bank 2007). 
 
This study aims to map characteristics of informal micro and small firms in Bolivia. We 
examine theories of informality in general and informality in Bolivia. Since firms’ informality 
and limits to growth is associated with governmental regulation (Maloney 2004), we also 
examine degrees of formality and the formalization process in Bolivia. We look at the 
association between revenue and formality for manufacturing firms. Our hypothesis is that a 
formal firm have higher estimated revenue. We also examine the association between 
formality and individual- and firm characteristics.  We expect our results to show that 
education, the age of the business owner and the number of years a firm has been active 
increase the probability of a firm being formal. Since previous studies suggest that women in 
Bolivia earn less and are more often informal we investigate the association between firm 
revenue and female ownership, as well as the probability of the firm being formal depending 
on the percentage of women in the workforce.  The study uses data on micro and small 
manufacturing firms collected by Bolivia’s National Statistics Institute.  The results show that 
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formal firms have higher estimated revenues and that education, the age of the owner as well 
as the age of the firm increases the probability of formality, while a higher percentage of 
women working in the firm decreases the probability. 
 
The structure of the paper is as follows: a literature review in section 2 is followed by 
informality and government regulation in Bolivia, in section 3. Section 4 contains differences 
between formal and informal firms and in section 5 we present our methodology. The 
empirical analysis and results are discussed in section 6. Section 7 concludes the thesis. An 
appendix is found in the end.  
2. Literature Review 
 
2.1 Informality 	
Many studies on the topic acknowledge the controversies in defining informal economic 
activities. The International Labour Organization (ILO) first coined the phrase informal sector 
in the 1970s during field research about additional income-generating activities. While the 
informal sector is often used to describe enterprises and economic activity, the new definition; 
informal economy, seeks to include all “…employment relationships that are not legally 
regulated or protected” (Chen 2007, p. 1).  In short, the new definition of the informal 
economy focuses on the kind of employment in addition to the characteristics of enterprises. 
Informal employment includes both self-employment in smaller unregistered enterprises and 
wage employment that is unprotected. Furthermore, informal economy is often restricted to 
non-agricultural activities and will be referred to as such in this paper (Chen 2007). 
 
It is worth noting that formal and informal activities often are interactive and overlapping due 
to the nature of the production system. There are few informal firms that operate in total 
isolation from formal enterprises. Most informal firms source raw materials or supply finished 
goods to formal enterprises, or both (Chen 2007). 
 
Despite its negative consequences for economic development and social protection, the 
informal economy can also alleviate poverty by providing job opportunities to individuals 
who are disadvantaged in the formal economy (Sakho & World Bank 2009). Informal 
activities provide opportunities for the lower income levels, constituted mainly by women, 
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indigenous people, young people and the older generations, often with a lower than average 
level of education (Collao et al. 2011). Maloney (2004) finds a positive correlation between 
the percentage of population active in the informal economy and average years of schooling. 
A lack of education coupled with a scarcity of formal jobs make individuals seek income 
opportunities outside the formal economy. However, both wages and job-security in the 
informal economy are generally lower than in the formal economy (World Bank 2007). ILO 
(2012) identifies a positive association between the percentage of population living below the 
poverty line and the percentage of labour force engaged in the informal economy.  
 
An important aspect of informality is low productivity as a result of limited access to 
physical, financial and human capital (Sakho & World Bank 2009). Informality is also closely 
linked to the share of labour force working in micro and small firms. According to the World 
Bank (2007), low productivity can be the cause of the plenitude of micro firms. Maloney 
(2004) finds a negative correlation between the share of self-employed in the labour force and 
industrial productivity. An increase in productivity and salaries in the formal economy 
increases the opportunity cost for self-employed in the informal economy as the labour 
demand curve shifts outwards. Increased productivity can thus lead to a decrease in the share 
of informal activities as individuals change from small-scale self-employment to formal 
employment.  
 
2.2 Informality and Firms 	
As discussed in the preceding section, there is a link between informality, productivity and the 
size of firms in an economy. La Porta & Shleifer (2008) find evidence for lower profits and 
lower production among informal firms in cross-country data. This is partly explained by the 
lower educational level and lower managerial level of informal firm owners. Gennaioli, La 
Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes & Shleifer (2013) find that the low productivity of informal firms is 
related to the low level of human capital of the people who run them. The World Bank (2007) 
shows that formal firms typically have higher labour productivity, while informal firms are 
more labour intensive since the comparative cost of labour they face is lower than that of 
formal firms. World Bank (2007) also finds that both types of firms seem to share similar 
constraints, except for the cost of credit, which appears to affect informal firms more. The 
cost and the limited access to credit forces informal firms to rely more on their own savings 
and loans from family and friends (World Bank 2007). The limited access to credit in turn 
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affects the access to equipment and physical capital as well as access to business and 
manufacturing premises. 
 
Micro and small firms tend to have less access to capital even though their return to capital is 
higher. A study based on Mexico’s National Survey of Microenterprises shows that returns to 
capital for firms with investments smaller than 200 dollars is 15 per cent per month, while 
enterprises with investments higher than 500 dollars get returns to capital of 3-5 per cent 
(McKenzie & Woodruff 2006). Despite this claim, many micro and small firms operate below 
their efficient scale of production, which is partly due to lack of credit, according to the World 
Bank (2007). Providing credit to small firms is risky and expensive in comparison to larger 
firms. Also, micro firms operated by women generally have less capital than comparative 
male firms, since it is more difficult for women to accumulate capital. Women are to a larger 
extent responsible for the household and child rearing, which take time away from paid work. 
Women also tend to earn less than men for the same paid work (Andersen & Muriel 2007). 
 
Why are firms informal despite their overall lower profit and productivity? Sakho & World 
Bank (2009) consider informality to be a rational choice; it is attractive to so many as it offers 
increased flexibility and independence, especially if the services provided in the formal 
economy are fairly poor.  
 
Female firm owners operate on a lower relative scale and their firms are more often informal.  
The higher rate of women active in the informal economy might reflect their greater need for 
flexibility due to reproductive and household roles (Sakho, & World Bank 2009). One 
possible explanation is that women have a smaller incentive to expand their business since it 
would then lose some of its attractive characteristics. Furthermore, profitability of female-
owned firms is typically lower, around 40 per cent lower than male micro firms a month 
(Andersen & Muriel 2007). 
 
Most notably the poor and uneducated parts of the workforce tend to work in the informal 
economy (Selby, Murphy & Lorenzen 1990). Despite the benefits of high flexibility, informal 
activities are not always a satisfactory choice.  Mercado & Rios (2005) find evidence for high 
dissatisfaction among the informal workforce. Furthermore, it matters whether the transition 
into the informal economy is voluntary or not. Maloney (2004) finds evidence for increased 
	 9 
wages when workers in Mexico voluntarily transitioned from formal employment to informal 
self-employment. One explanation for this wage gain might be attributed to the need for 
informal wages to, at least to some extent, cover for the lost benefits of social protection.  
 
Previous literature on the subject of informality presents various explanations of why some 
firms are informal; some argue formality is a choice made by firms, while others explain 
informality as a result of exclusion.   
 
Barriers to formality such as complex and costly regulations, a view most famously presented 
by de Soto (1998), is one type of exclusion from formality. Maloney (2004) presents rather 
contrary evidence of micro firms’ voluntary participation in formal institutions, the decision 
being made in a cost-benefit analysis. Business owners choose their degree of participation 
according to their preferences and the constraints faced. Similarly, Perry et al. (2007) 
underline the importance of the “social contract” between state and economic actors. If the 
state is not able to provide services for economic actors, the benefits of registering and paying 
taxes would be substantially diminished. Workers in the informal economy may instead 
choose to rely on social protection provided by other actors. 
 
McKenzie & Sakho (2008) argue that firms choose whether to become formal by registering 
for taxes or not if the expected present value of net benefits from becoming formal outweighs 
the direct costs. That is, the choice between formality and informality is illustrated in the 
following equation:  
  𝛿!𝐸 𝜋!,! − 𝜋!,!!!!! + 𝜃!"#!!"#$#%& > [𝐶!"#$% + 𝐶!"#$ + 𝐶!"#$%&'()!" ] (1) 
 
Where 𝜋!,! indicates the firm’s profit if it is formally registered at time t, and 𝜋!,! indicates 
the firm’s profit if it is not formally registered at time t. 𝜃!"#!!"#$#%& indicates the benefit to 
firm owners from following the law and to make them feel like they are contributing to state 
welfare by paying taxes. 𝐶!"#$%  indicates the monetary, 𝐶!"#$ , time and 𝐶!"#$%&'()$" 
information costs from registering (McKenzie & Sakho 2008). 
 
The equation above demonstrates an essential challenge of detecting the effect of formality on 
a firm’s profitability. The effect of formality on firms’ profits, (𝜋!,! − 𝜋!,!), depends on the 
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option to register for taxes. Hence, if there are no costs of registering and no non-monetary 
benefits from doing so, firms that find it profitable to be registered will have done so and only 
firms that don’t find it profitable to be registered will continue to be informal. The costs of 
time and information will depend on the time it takes to register and also the distance from the 
firm and an office where they can register, and also the amount of general information that is 
available about the registration procedure. 
3. Background 	
In recent years, significant changes have taken place in Bolivia. Between 2001 and 2005 the 
country went through five different presidencies. Since the election of the first indigenous 
President Evo Morales in 2006, the country has had an average growth rate of 5 per cent, 
partly due to high export prices on commodities such as gas, minerals and soybeans (The 
Economist 2014; World Bank 2015). The government under Morales introduced a new 
constitution, adopted in 2009. The same year Plan Nacional de Desarrollo and Plan Sectorial 
de Desarrollo Productivo con Empleo Digno came into practice, both containing objectives 
for decreasing informality. Efforts have focused mainly on labour legislation, while costs and 
bureaucracy remain high (Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia 2009). 
 
3.1 Informality in Bolivia  	
In Bolivia, the informal economy amounts to around 70 per cent of gross domestic product, 
the highest in Latin America (Schneider 2005). Bolivia also has the highest rate of informal 
employment in Latin America, reaching 75.6 per cent (ILO 2013). Additionally, data on five-
year periods starting in 1990 shows that Bolivia is one of the few economies in Latin America 
where non-agricultural employment in the informal economy has increased (Charmes 2012). 
The plenitude of micro enterprises in Bolivia affect tax collection, 10 companies provide 53 
per cent of the country’s tax revenues (SIN 2014).  
 
The National Statistics Institute (INE 2013) reports that 94,9 per cent of all enterprises in 
Bolivia are micro enterprises (1-4 employees), while 4,8 per cent are small and medium 
enterprises (5- 49 employees) and only 0,3 per cent are large enterprises (50 or more 
employees). The same data presents the existence of 623,251 micro enterprises across the 
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country: 222,012 are in La Paz (35,6 per cent), 153,033 in Santa Cruz (24,6 per cent) and 
116,980 in Cochabamba (18,8 per cent) (Salvatierra 2013).  
 
Statistics from Bolivia’s household survey (INE 2014) show that the main part of Bolivians 
are self-employed, 42,77 per cent of women and 47,75 per cent of men are informally self-
employed (see Table (A.2) in the appendix). Women are more often informal and operate in 
sectors where profits are lower such as food vending, textiles and clothing manufacturing, 
while men tend to operate in wood manufacturing and transportation sectors where profits are 
higher (Lunde, Sakho & Arribas-Banos 2009).  
 
In the last few decades an increasing number of Bolivian women have entered into the labour 
market. However, the entry rate has not been matched by an increase in formal working 
positions (Andersen & Muriel 2007). Labour regulations are more restrictive towards women, 
as an example the permitted working hours per week are lower and they are not allowed to 
work at night apart from a few exceptions (NATLEX 2014). Female owned-businesses also 
tend to be less profitable. 	
3.2 Governmental Regulations and Business Climate 	
Economies with more business regulations and weaker judicial services also tend to have 
higher informality in the long run (Loayza & Rigoloni 2006). As discussed in section (2.3), 
high costs of registering and paying taxes influence the firms’ decision to become formal. 
Grounding in this previous discussion, we proceed to a description of government regulations 
in Bolivia.  
 
For a firm to be fully formal in Bolivia, three types of registration are required at three 
different government agencies. First, the firm must obtain a municipal business license by 
registering with the municipal government. Second, they need to obtain a tax identification 
number by registering with the National Tax Office (Servicios de Impuestos Nacionales, SIN). 
Third, and finally, they need to register at the Registry of Commerce (Fundempresa). In 
addition to registering their firm with these three institutions, firms with employees must 
register with the National Health System (Caja Nacional de Salud, CNS) in order for them to 
avail of health benefits. Furthermore, they must be registered with the Pension Fund 
(Administradora de Fondos de Pensiones, AFP), for social security, and finally, the employer 
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needs to register their employees with the Labour Ministry (Minesterio de Trabajo, Empleo y 
Prevision Social). Thus, nearly all micro and small enterprises are informal to some degree 
(McKenzie & Sakho 2008).  
 
Using a comparative lens, the Doing Business Index (World Bank 2015) ranks economies 
with respect to business regulations on local firms. Bolivia ranks at 157 of the 189 economies 
represented in the index.  Most notably, under the topic Paying taxes, Bolivia ranks last of the 
189 countries. This is largely due to the world’s highest average time taken; to prepare, file 
and pay taxes. The procedures (Table 1) take on average 1025 hours per year compared with 
the average 366 hours for the Latin American and Caribbean region. Under the topic Starting 
a business, Bolivia ranks 171 with an average of 49 days, a cost of 64,4 per cent income per 
capita with 15 corresponding procedures.   
 
TABLE 1: DOING BUSINESS IN BOLIVIA 
Starting a Business in Bolivia Paying Taxes 
Procedures 
(number) Time (days) 
Cost (% of 
income) 
  
Payments 
(number) Time (days) 
Total tax rate 
(% of profit) 
Paid-in min. 
capital (% of 
income) 
  
 15 50 57.9 0 42 1025 83.7 
Source: Doing Business Index (2016). 
 
Doing Business measures companies that are a limited liability company with a minimum of 
five employees. The Doing Business Index is included in this study to give an overall 
representation of how businesses in Bolivia relate to businesses in other countries. For micro 
and small enterprises the procedures are fewer than for limited liability companies.  
 
Applying our theoretical framework as seen in equation (1) in section (2.3), we see that 
becoming formal in Bolivia is associated with numerous procedures and costly regulations, 
making firms less likely to be formal. The equation shows that, among others factors, the time 
and costs of registering will determine weather a firm become formal or not. For micro firms 
in Bolivia the time to complete these registrations require seven procedures, takes about 42 
days excluding the time and cost it takes traveling back and forth to the offices and the cost 
for all procedures is 433 BOB, which corresponds to 15,09 per cent of the income (see Table 
(A.3) in the appendix).  
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Other costs associated with formal activities is paying employees according to minimum 
wage (see Figure (A.1) in the appendix) and paying obligatory Christmas bonus. The 
government under Morales has implemented annual increases in the minimum wage, 
averaging 14,4 per cent annually since 2006. 86 per cent of the salaried workforce are 
receiving this wage, while only 42 per cent of the, non-salaried workers are paid accordingly 
(Muriel 2014). Also, since 2014 a double Christmas bonus is obligatory for formal firms 
(Minesterio de Trabajo, Empleo y Prevision Social 2015).  
 
As discussed previously there are different degrees of formality. Firms registering for a tax 
number would first of all be obliged to pay the costs of registering and taxes. Moving beyond 
paying taxes to engage with more government institutions increases the regulations applicable 
to firms.  A firm registered at the tax office might not pay minimum wage and Christmas 
bonus to all their employees, but a firm seeking to be fully formal would have to abide by 
these regulations.  
4. Data and Data Description 
 
In this section we present the data and a description of the data, we also compare main 
characterises of formal and informal firms.  	
4.1 Data 	
The cross-sectional data, Encuesta MyPEs de la Industria Manufacturera, was collected by 
The National Institute of Statistics in Bolivia.  The survey was conducted in 2014 and 
contains 9516 observations. The data has been collected from the nine different geographical 
departments in Bolivia and includes 21 different manufacturing sectors. 
 
4.2 Data Description 	
In this study we define formality as having a tax number from the tax office. This definition 
was introduced as a measure of informality by UDAPE (2007) and has been used in previous 
studies in Bolivia to measure the formality of firms (Andersen & Muriel 2007; World Bank 
2009). In our sample, registration with the national tax office is the second most common type 
of registration for firms (Figure 1). A total of 1963 (20,63 per cent) of the firms are formal 
according to this definition. While 809 firms have registered with all of the three most 
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common institutions; Municipal Government, National Tax Office and Registry of 
Commerce, only 94 firms have also registered their employees with the three additional 
agencies.  
 
 
 
Firms that have registered at the tax office are also more likely to engage with other 
governmental institutions. Formal firms would therefore also be expected to pay the 
obligatory Christmas bonus to a larger extent than informal firms. However, of the total 1271 
firms in the sample that pay Christmas bonuses, 41 per cent are informal. Thus, although 
informal firms do not comply with legal requirements, they may have a type of adjusted 
compliance, paying Christmas bonuses but without being obliged to pay the legally 
determined amounts.  
 
The main part of the informal firms is found in La Paz department (see Figure (A.2) in the 
appendix). It shows the distribution of formal and informal firms in the nine departments in 
absolute numbers. A likely contributory factor of the high rate of informality in La Paz is its 
inclusion of El Alto, a highly informal and fast growing city close to the capital (Hillenkamp, 
Lapeyre & Lemaître 2014). The rate of formal firms in departments varies between 6 per cent 
and 37 per cent. However, the procedures of becoming formal are the same for all 
departments of Bolivia.  
 
23,67%
20,63%
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1,91% 2,27% 3,31%
0%
5%
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15%
20%
25%
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FIGURE 1: PERCENTAGE OF FIRMS REGISTERED
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Out of the total 21956 individuals in the sample, 63 per cent work in informal firms. The 
average number of employees per firm is 2,3. Individuals can be divided into eight types of 
labour activity. Table (2) shows a comparison between the labour activities for formal and 
informal firms. Individuals in formal firms are more often permanent employees and 
temporary employees. Only a tenth of formal workers are self-employed. Among informal 
workers the most common activity is self-employment. It is also more common for 
individuals in informal firms to be family workers.  
 
TABLE 2: EMPLOYMENT IN FORMAL AND INFORMAL FIRMS 
  
Receiving Salary  Receiving no Salary  
 
Self-
employed  Employers 
Permanent 
employees 
Temporary 
employees 
Family 
workers Employers 
Family 
workers Trainees  Total 
Formal 9.51% 3.98% 36.59% 20.93% 4.75% 15.87% 7.90% 0.47% 100% 
Informal 33.72% 2.66% 15.36% 12.53% 5.54% 13.10% 16.52% 0.56% 100% 
 
Table A.4 (in the appendix) presents some of the main differences between formal and 
informal firms in the sample. The average annual revenue of a formal firm is almost three 
times as high as than of an informal firm and average revenue per employee in formal firms is 
53,7 per cent. Four categories of expenses are presented in which formal and informal firms 
have similar expenditures as percentage of annual sales in the categories operating costs paid 
monthly, operating costs paid yearly and utilities expenses. Informal firms pay less for raw 
materials as a percentage of revenue than formal firms. A notable difference can also be seen 
in the average value of capital; formal firms have 3,7 times the value of capital, and the 
double average capital per employee in comparison to informal firms. Formal firms more 
often have a loan, 51,81 per cent of the formal firms and 35.23 per cent of the firms in our 
sample have a loan. Information about loans are however limited to the holding of a loan, 
rather than the size of the loan. The higher amount of capital for formal firms might imply 
that their loans are larger. Having a loan could, in addition to being an indicator for access to 
finance, also measure willingness to financial commitment as well as and knowledge about 
bank procedures.  
 
Despite the difference in the amount of formal and informal firms having a loan, they report 
similar reasons for not obtaining one. Figure (2) shows that the firms experience similar 
problems with high interest rates. Informal firms more often report lack of guarantees, short 
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payback time and many requirements as an obstacle to obtaining a loan. Among both formal 
and informal firms the most common reason stated is having no interest in obtaining a loan. 
 
Note: Based on 5825 responses to the question: ”Why do you not have a loan?” 
 
The dataset contains firms in 21 different sectors classified according to the International 
Standard Industrial Classification of All Economic Activities, Rev.4 (United Nations Statistics 
Division, 2016). Table (A.5) in the appendix shows the descriptive statistics of manufacturing 
firms. Manufacturing of wearing apparel constitutes the largest part of our sample, followed 
by manufacturing of food products and manufacture of fabricated metal products. ‘ 
 
The rate of formality varies greatly between the different sectors (see Table (A.5) in the 
appendix). Formality rates of over 50 per cent are found in four industries, the largest of them 
the printing and reproduction of recorded media. Industries with higher capital intensity tend 
to have a higher percentage rate of formal firms, with the exception of the manufacturing of 
wearing apparel.  
 
Figure (4) shows a correlation between the rate of formality and capital intensity (measured as 
average capital per employee) in the different sectors. Industries with higher capital intensity 
tend to have a higher percentage of formal firms. The figure also shows an outlier, the sector 
of wearing apparel, characterized by a low degree of formality, 10,63 per cent and high 
capital intensity.  
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High prices on raw materials is the most common reason stated for not increasing sales for 
both informal and formal firms (Figure 4). Despite this we find no correlation between 
percentage spent on raw materials (in comparison to total costs) and revenue.  Informal and 
formal firms report similar challenges for increasing sales. Informal firms do however more 
often report lack of machinery, as an obstacle to increased sales while lack of skilled labour is 
more common among the formal firms.    
 
 
Note: Based on 8646 responses to the question: “What are the barriers to increased sales?”	
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5. Methodology  
 
We estimate the relationship between annual revenue and being formal using the following 
baseline equation: 
 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒! = 𝛽! + 𝛽!𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙! + 𝛽!𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑟! + 𝛽!𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑟!! + 𝛽!𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙! +	𝛽!𝑓𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟! + 𝛽!𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛! +  𝜀! 				 	 	 															(2) 	
Where the dependent variable is logrevenue, which is a measure of the logarithmic value of 
annual revenue, and formal is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm has a tax number and 0 
if the firm lacks tax number. Logarithmic transformation is done for revenue to achieve an 
approximation to a normal distribution. The coefficient of interest is the estimated 
relationship between being formal and revenue of firms.  
 
Most preferably we would use profit as a dependent variable as this would be the most 
important measure of firm performance. The sample offers several variables for both fixed 
and flexible costs with the exception of the number of observations reporting salaries and 
days worked. Because of the limitation in estimating profit we choose to use the second best 
option of firm performance, annual revenue.  
 
Our hypothesis is that formality has a positive association with firm revenue, all other things 
being equal.  
 
The other independent variables are: labour; the number of people working in the firm 
independent of position, logcapital; the log of total value of machines and equipment. 
Logarithmic transformation is done for capital to approximate a normal distribution. 
Femaleowner is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the owner or owners are only female. The 
independent variable loan is a dummy equal to 1 if the firm has a loan. The error term, 𝜀, is 
assumed to be normally distributed.  
 
Since the dataset does not provide information on hours or days worked, it is assumed that all 
labour categories are contributing equally to the firms’ activities and we do not differentiate 
between positions in the firm. A squared variable of labour is added to the regression to 
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capture the diminishing marginal productivity of labour. We expect labour to be positively 
correlated with revenue.   
 
We use total value of machines to represent capital per firm.  By using logcapital as the total 
value of machines we control for the differences in output and value of output due to the 
access to better physical factors of production. The assumption is that a machine with higher 
quality and/or higher output would also be self-assessed as more valuable and that the value 
of machines in the sample can be used to represent capital.    
 
We expect that having only female owners have an effect on annual revenue. To control for 
the difference in revenue attributable to the difference between women and men we add 
femaleowner. Theory suggests that women in Bolivia might choose to be informal due to 
lifestyle demand; their greater need of being flexible due to household and childcare 
responsibilities. Our hypothesis is that if a firm has a female owner, it will probably have a 
negative effect on revenue since most families do not have access to day-care services and the 
family member’s primary responsibility for the children might therefore work fewer days and 
hours (Andersen & Muriel 2007; World Bank 2009) 
 
Loan is included as a measure of access to financial capital among firms.  
 
Both formal and informal firms might have incentives to avoid reporting their true value of 
annual revenues and sales. This could cause their financial statements to underrepresent the 
true profitability (World Bank 2007). Since only 27 per cent of respondents in the survey 
engage in bookkeeping, an estimation of the total sales over a whole year might contain errors 
because respondents cannot recall all payments. Furthermore, a lack of separation between 
private and firm economy means some of the firm assets and outputs might be used for 
private purposes and are therefore not accounted for in the financial statement. This could 
lead to an underestimation of the annual revenue and/or an overestimation of costs. When we 
subtract all four cost categories presented in Table (A.4) (in the appendix) from the revenue a 
substantial part (33 per cent) of the firms show a negative or break-even result. Notably, this 
is the result without having subtracted the cost of labour. We assume eventual false 
estimations are random and do not influence our regression.  
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Robust standard errors are clustered at the sector level. Revenues for firms within the same 
sectors may be correlated since they are subject to similar environmental and production 
characteristics.  
 
In our second regression, we use formal as a dependent variable to understand the effects of 
the explanatory variables in equation (3) below on formality. Our hypothesis is that education 
has a positive effect on formality while the percentage of female workers might be negatively 
correlated with formality. 
 𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙! = 𝛽! + 𝛽!𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛! + 𝛽!𝑎𝑔𝑒! + 𝛽!𝑓𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑟!  + 𝛽!𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠! + 𝜀!   							(3)
	 	
Our first dependent variable education, takes a value from 1-4 depending on the level of 
education of the owner. 1 = courses for adults with duration less than a year, 2 = primary 
education, 3 = secondary education, 4 = higher education. Based on our theoretical 
framework previously discussed, we would expect education to be positively correlated with 
the probability that a company is formal. Age describes the age of the respondent. 
Femalelabour is a variable based on the percentage of total workforce in the firm that are 
females. We expect this variable to be consistent with previous findings discussed in the 
literature showing a negative association with formality. Years is the number of years the firm 
has been active. (For a full list of variables see Table (A.1) in the appendix.) 
6. Empirical Results and Analysis 	
The OLS estimation with revenue as dependent variable is presented in Table (3) in the 
appendix1. The results are divided into five different models where several explanatory 
variables have been added gradually. The estimates show a positive correlation between 
formality and revenue. Formal firms are predicted to have 23 per cent higher revenue when all 
control variables are added. The results are economically and statistically significant. 
 
To control for fixed factors that might be correlated with revenue we first introduce fixed 
effects for departments, in model (4) and in model (5) we introduce fixed effects for sectors.  
																																																								1	Due to missing values for annual revenue the observations amount to 6469 firms. 	
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Adding these fixed effects increases the positive coefficient between formality and revenue, 
as seen in model (5). A formal firm is expected to have higher revenue. After controlling for 
departments and sectors in model (5) the effect of formality on revenue increases by 4,5 
percentage points resulting in a 27,5 per cent estimated revenue for formal firms.  
 
TABLE 3: REVENUE AND FORMALITY 
Log revenue (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
Formal 0.230*** 0.224*** 0.223*** 0.261*** 0.275*** 
 (0.0509) (0.0481) (0.0481) (0.0489) (0.0364) 
Labour 0.282*** 0.274*** 0.271*** 0.261*** 0.262*** 
 (0.0142) (0.0122) (0.0123) (0.0129) (0.0140) 
Labour2 -0.0104*** -0.00970*** -0.00952*** -0.00904*** -0.00927*** 
 (0.000965) (0.000846) (0.000866) (0.000961) (0.00102) 
Log capital 0.342*** 0.321*** 0.315*** 0.317*** 0.320*** 
 (0.0180) (0.0125) (0.0108) (0.0106) (0.0134) 
Female owner  -0.236*** -0.239*** -0.217*** -0.155*** 
  (0.0526) (0.0511) (0.0438) (0.0503) 
Loan   0.0979** 0.0950** 0.0968*** 
   (0.0375) (0.0341) (0.0337) 
Constant 7.665*** 7.938*** 7.949*** 7.977*** 7.933*** 
 (0.201) (0.141) (0.133) (0.123) (0.109) 
Department FE No No No Yes Yes 
Sector FE No No No No Yes 
Number of clusters 21 21 21 21 21 
R2 0.518 0.527 0.529 0.540 0.550 
Observations 6,469 6,469 6,469 6,469 6,469 
Note: The table reports OLS estimates with fixed effects in regression 4 and 5. The unit of observation is the amount of 
firms that have responded to the questions focused on in the regression. Standard errors are in the parentheses. Standard 
errors are clustered at the sector level through all regressions.  
*** Significant at the 1 per cent level. 
** Significant at the 5 per cent level. 
 
Labour also has a positive statistically significant, effect on revenue. In model (5) one 
additional worker is associated with a 26,2 per cent higher revenue. As the number of workers 
increases the coefficient of labour decreases. An additional 15 workers have a negative effect 
on revenue. 
 
Capital is statistically significant and positively correlated with revenue. For every change in 
capital by one per cent we expect revenue to change by 0,32 per cent, model (5). 
 
The negative effect of having only female owners in model (2) confirms our hypothesis. The 
variable femaleowner has a negative, statistically and economically significant effect on 
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revenue with 23,6 per cent. When adding more control variables in model (5) the coefficient 
for female owner decreases, although it continues to have a negative effect on revenue, which 
would indicate that our results are robust. 
 
Adding the dummy variable in model (3) for whether the firm has a loan, we get an estimated 
positive, statistically significant coefficient. Firms that have a loan have a 9,68 per cent higher 
revenue than firms without a loan, model (5).  
 
R-squared increases from 51,8 per cent in model 1, to 55,8 per cent in model (5). 
 
Our linear probability model uses the dummy variable, formal, as dependent variable (Table 
3)2. The results in model (1) illustrate how the probability of a firm being formal increases 
with 13,6 percentage points for every additional level of education. When controlling for 
more variables the effect of education on formality decreases but continues to be positive. In 
model (5) where we have controlled for departments and sectors we notice that the coefficient 
of education has reduced to 9,23 percentage points. To control for fixed factors that might be 
correlated with formality, we introduce fixed effects for departments in model (4) and in 
model (5) we introduce fixed effects for sectors. The results are statistically significant 
throughout all models.  
 
Our second explanatory variable, age, also shows a positive correlation with formality. Older 
firm owners are more likely to have formal firms. The owner’s age is statistically significant 
and positively correlated but has a very small effect on formality, 0,098 percentage points 
increase in probability for every additional year of age, model (5).  
 
The variable female labour in model (2) shows that the percentage of female labour is 
statistically significant at the 1 per cent level and is negatively associated with formality. The 
larger the share of women in the workforce, the smaller probability the firm has of being 
formal. The coefficient of femalelabour continues to be negatively associated with formality 
when all control variables are added in model (5). A problem with the linear probability 
model is that of predicting probabilities that are not contained in the interval 0-1. Therefore 
we estimate a logit model odds ratio to compare the negative value of femalelabour. The logit 																																																								2	Due to missing values, observations amount to 8023 firms.	
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model confirms that femalelabour has a negative coefficient.  
 
The variable years has a positive correlation with formality. Operating one more year 
increases the probability of being formal with 0,172 percentage points when using fixed 
effects, model (5).  
TABLE 4: FORMALITY 
Formal (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
Education 0.136*** 0.127*** 0.127*** 0.117*** 0.0923*** 
 (0.00602) (0.00600) (0.00600) (0.00587) (0.00575) 
Age 0.00239*** 0.00198*** 0.00146*** 0.00115*** 0.000988** 
 (0.000381) (0.000379) (0.000440) (0.000431) (0.000421) 
Female labour  -0.142*** -0.140*** -0.130*** -0.0822*** 
  (0.0113) (0.0113) (0.0111) (0.0135) 
Years   0.00115** 0.00149*** 0.00172*** 
   (0.000490) (0.000484) (0.000470) 
Constant -0.252*** -0.152*** -0.143*** -0.194*** -0.165*** 
 (0.0260) (0.0270) (0.0273) (0.0270) (0.0304) 
Department FE No No No Yes Yes 
Sector FE No No No No Yes 
R-squared 0.060 0.079 0.079 0.130 0.198 
Observations 8,043 8,023 8,023 8,023 8,023 
Notes: The table reports OLS estimates with fixed effects in regression 4 and 5. The unit of observation is the amount of 
firms that have responded to the questions focused on in the regression. Standard errors are in the parentheses.  
*** Significant at the 1 per cent level. 
** Significant at the 5 per cent level. 
 
R-squared has increased significantly from 6 per cent in model (1) to 19,8 per cent in model 
(5) after adding our control variables. Lets not neglect the fact that when we add more 
variables to the regression R-squared has a capacity of increasing. As can be expected in a 
linear probability model. There is heteroskedasticity because of the binominal distribution of 
the error term.  
7. Conclusion 	
The aim of this study has been to map characteristics of formal and informal micro and small 
firms in Bolivia, and to test if being formal has an effect on revenue. From the results, it can 
be concluded that being formal has a significant association with firm revenue. This is 
consistent with our hypothesis, as well as with previous studies.  
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Although significant associations between formality and firm and individual characteristics 
are found, this study does not show causal relationships. Thus, the results from the first 
regression could imply that formal firms have higher revenue because they are formal, or that 
firms with higher revenue prefer to be formal.  
 
The linear probability regression, with formal as dependent variable, show that the education 
of the owner and the age of the firm increase the probability of a firm being formal. As 
discussed in the theory section, the cost of information can influence the decision to become 
formal. Education of the owner in the regression can, in addition to a higher general skill 
level, also decrease the information cost of formalizing discussed in equation (1). The age of 
the owner could also decrease the information costs of being formal, since knowledge about 
procedures may be related to experience. Both the age of the firm owner and the number of 
years in business of the firm can influence the probability of a firm being a less temporary 
source of income, and therefore a more likely receiver of investment of time and capital.  
 
As suggested by theory, individuals who cannot find employment elsewhere are more likely 
to start their own business. This could imply that their activities are based on more short-term 
engagements while they look for other opportunities. However, the short lifespan of firms 
could also imply informal firms more often go bankrupt.  
 
In both regressions, being a woman is negatively correlated with both revenue and formality. 
The coefficients of the female related variables may be overestimated since they also include 
women’s tendency to work fewer paid hours.  One possible reason for this is that women have 
other responsibilities outside of their job, such as taking care of the household and children.  
The current regressions could suffer from omitted variable bias due to the lack of control for 
working hours. To further investigate the relationship between women and informality we 
would need to control for the differences in hours worked by both owners and employees.  
 
Furthermore, we cannot control for other inherent characteristics of firm owners and workers 
that could be correlated with formality. These could be variables such as knowledge about 
formalization processes, inclination to entrepreneurship and knowledge about how to run a 
business, such as marketing and bookkeeping.  
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The formality of a firm is better expressed in degrees of formality rather than described as 
exclusively formal or informal. This study defines formality as having a tax number although 
a fully law abiding firm would be registered at five additional institutions, pay the full 
Christmas bonus and minimum salary. This suggests that formal, similarly to informal firms, 
also adjust their degree of participation with government institutions. The study also shows 
that despite having different characteristics, formal and informal firms face similar challenges 
in, for example increasing sales and obtaining a loan.  
 
In Bolivia a firm has to include monetary costs of paying taxes, minimum wage, and double 
Christmas bonuses. But there are also other non-monetary costs of formalization such as loss 
of flexibility and time taken to learn about, and register with government agencies that are 
difficult to measure. Also, even if firms would want to become formal they might not afford 
to do so given their small revenue in comparison to their costs.  
 
In this study, as well as previous studies made on the subject, defining and measuring 
informality and informal activities provide a challenge to empirical analysis. Cross-sectional 
data used in this study can uncover important correlations, but do not give opportunities to 
study causal effects. Additional studies identifying such an effect would certainly be useful 
for providing policy recommendations for economic development.   
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Tables 
 
TABLE A.1: LIST OF VARIABLES 
VARIABLE  Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Age 8077 43.15947 12.28931 14 98 
Annual revenue 7739 180867.3 371990.6 3975 6300000 
Capital 6605 27433.91 93296.1 0 3480000 
Education 9516 16.20839 9.264206 0 37 
Female labour 8070 .4105164 .4093042 0 1 
Female owner 9516 .2941362 .4556774 0 1 
Formal 9516 .2062842 .4046581 0 1 
Labour 8070 2.720694 2.265839 1 19 
Loan 9516 .3865069 .4869746 0 1 
Total annual cost 7759 277772.7 781905.7 0 20100000 
Years 9516 9.693043 10.85063 0 69 
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TABLE A.2: EMPLOYMENT IN BOLIVIA 
Status in employment Men Women Total 
Self-employed  
 
 
Formal 4.11% 4.30% 4.20% 
Informal 47.75% 42.77% 45.54% 
Employees  
 
 
Formal 3.66% 4.13% 3.87% 
Informal 14.97% 6.11% 11.04% 
Family worker  
 
 
Formal 0.80% 2.52% 1.56% 
Informal 14.98% 34.40% 23.59% 
Employer (no salary)  
 
 
Formal 2.55% 1.46% 2.07% 
Informal 9.98% 3.85% 7.26% 
Employer (salary)  
 
 
Formal 0.66% 0.36% 0.53% 
Informal 0.00% 0.04% 0.02% 
Production cooperativist  
 
 
Formal 0.24% 0.04% 0.15% 
Informal 0.29% 0.02% 0.17% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 
Notes: Calculations from Encuesta de Hogares, INE 2014. Based on 11893 observations 
where formality is defined as working for a firm with tax number. 
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TABLE A.3: STARTING A BUSINESS 
No. Procedure Time to Complete 
Associated 
Costs 
1 
Start the application for opening up a 
business by checking uniqueness of name 
at the Registry of Commerce. 
1 day 78 BOB 
2 Register at the National Tax Service to obtain the tax identification number (NIT). 1 day No charge 
3 
Obtain a municipal business license from 
the municipality where the business is 
located. 
5 days No charge 
4 
Register the company deed with the 
Registry of Commerce to obtain legal 
capacity (Matricula de Comercio). 
1 day 260 BOB 
5 Register employees for national health insurance (Caja Nacional de Salud).  2 days 15 BOB  
6 
Register employees at the Ministry of 
Labor, enrol in the “Registro Obligatorio 
de Empleadores-ROE”. 
3 days 80 BOB 
7 
Register employees with the pensions 
system (Administradoras de Fondos de 
Pensiones). 
20 days No charge 
  Total Time and Costs 42 days 433 BOB 
Source: Servicios de Impuestos Nacionales (2015), Fundempresa (2015). 
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TABLE A.4: DIFFERENCES BETWEEN FORMAL AND INFORMAL FIRMS 
  
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Observations 
Average revenue  Formal 351700.7 620991 6982 6300000 1917 Informal 124617.3 210335.8 3975 6000000 5822 
Average number of employees Formal 4.15 3.07 1 19 1952 Informal 2.27 1.7 1 19 6117 
Average revenue per employee  Formal 84568 109949.8 131.79 1493610 1917 Informal 55286.07 66777 570.75 1602660 5822 
Monthly operating costs  Formal 19452.01 29251.66 120 557784 1878 Informal 6310.52 10020.78 120 157800 5439 
% of revenue  Formal 5.53%     Informal 5.06% 
    Annual operating costs  Formal 4178.15 15199,26 30 364000 1585 Informal 1090.88 2924.61 30 60270 3489 
% of revenue  Formal 1.19%     Informal 0.88% 
    Utilities expensens Formal 9893.66 26571.5 120 822000 1863.00 Informal 3791.6 14833.38 108 971820 5520 
% of revenue  Formal 2.81%     Informal 3.04% 
    Cost of raw material Formal 160698.5 313428.3 3000 4200000 1917 Informal 59754.61 105626.1 3000 3000000 5822 
% of revenue Formal 45.69%     Informal 47.95% 
    Average value of capital  Formal 59380.26 168245.1 250 348000 1711 Informal 16331.84 37125.07 81.14 1200000 4874 
Average capital per employee  Formal 14176.26 26876.65 50.69 348500 1711 Informal 7381.414 14097.59 40.57 280000 4874 
Percentage of firms with a loan Formal 51.81%    9516 Informal 35.23% 
  
  
Notes: All variables are calculated to show the yearly total. 
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TABLE A.5: MANUFACTURING SECTORS: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 
  Sector average 
 
Manufacturing sector % formal 
Annual 
Revenue 
Firm 
Size Capital Observations 
Food products  14.62% 122142.00 2.3 8293.85 1662 
Beverages  23.81% 122619.05 2.5 14947.89 84 
Textiles  18.24% 97690.53 1.8 10652.07 433 
Wearing apparel  10.63% 91543.83 1.8 70271.67 2578 
Leather and related products  7.57% 118326.69 2.3 10563.37 251 
Products of wood and cork 23.60% 208897.49 2.6 37272.51 517 
Paper and paper products 27.78% 160710.39 3.0 44354.52 18 
Printing and reproduction of 
recorded media 66.42% 207769.42 3.1 57845.98 399 
Chemicals and chemical 
products 64.29% 411352.36 5.6 67941.10 14 
Basic pharmaceutical products 
and pharmaceutical preparations 0.00% 37301.30 2.0 310.00 10 
Rubber and plastics products 27.78% 183950.62 2.5 17989.08 162 
Other non-metallic mineral 
products 23.56% 212328.77 3.4 27170.32 365 
Basic metals 40.00% 769453.20 3.2 8000.00 5 
Fabricated metal products, 
except machinery and 
equipment 20.98% 186880.24 2.3 24158.35 1311 
Computer, electronic and 
optical products 59.52% 178888.86 3.0 35858.85 42 
Electrical equipment 51.67% 351666.67 4.1 59489.18 60 
Machinery and equipment  33.70% 328260.87 3.1 59804.22 92 
Motor vehicles, trailers and 
semi-trailers 32.94% 176470.59 2.8 26748.68 170 
Other transport equipment 0.00% 176439.14 1.6 25576.78 7 
Furniture 24.19% 203488.37 2.9 27848.26 860 
Other 35.67% 119957.54 1.9 11410.89 471 
Uncategorized 0 215919.00 2.3 0.00 5 
Mean 27.59% 212820.77 2.7 29386.71 
 Min  0.00% 37301.3 1.6 0.00 
 Max 66.42% 769453.2 5.6 70271.67 
 Observations  9516 7739 9516 9516 9516 	
